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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper introduces a firm-strategy perspective to the global combat against environmental 
pollution. We find that U.S. plants release less toxic emissions when their parent firm imports 
more from low-wage countries (LWCs). Consistent with the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, goods 
imported by U.S. firms from LWCs are in more pollution-intensive industries; U.S. plants also 
shift production to less pollution-intensive industries and spend less on pollution abatement when 
their parent firm imports more from LWCs. The negative impact of LWC imports on toxic 
emissions is stronger for U.S. plants located in counties with more powerful institutions, but 
weaker for more-capable U.S. plants and firms. These results highlight the role of local 
institutions and firm capabilities in explaining firms’ choice of offshoring and environmental 
strategy. 
 
Keywords: environmental strategy, pollution haven, offshoring, institutions, globalization, 
supply chain sustainability 
 
 
                                                          
 
*The research in this paper was conducted while both authors were Special Sworn Status researchers of the 
U.S. Census Bureau at the Michigan Census Research Data Center (RDC). Support for this research at the 
Michigan Census RDC from NSF (ITR-0427889) is gratefully acknowledged. Any opinions and conclusions 
expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. 
All results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed. We thank Lee 
Branstetter, Heiwai Tang, Reed Walker, and Nathan Wilson for helpful comments and Randy Becker for 
information about the PACE surveys. 
Li: Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, 2F, Tower E3, Oriental Plaza, 1 East Change An Avenue, 
Beijing 100738, P. R. China. xyli@ckgsb.edu.cn 
Zhou: Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, 701 Tappan St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, 
USA. ymz@umich.edu. 
 
 2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The global effort to combat pollution has gained tremendous momentum in recent years. The 
United States and China, the two largest emitters of greenhouse gas, issued a joint announcement 
in 2014 to strengthen bilateral cooperation, including joint technological initiatives, research 
efforts, and economic policies, to tackle climate change (The White House, 2014). One hundred 
ninety-six countries attending the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference voted to 
adopt a joint agreement to curb global warming (NPR, 2015). India and France launched a global 
alliance to mobilize investments from rich countries to develop solar power around the world, 
especially in sun-rich but cash-poor tropical countries (Financial Times, 2015). Participation in 
these global initiatives is not always welcomed at home, however. Only recently have politicians, 
the media, and large businesses in the United States started to openly accept climate change and 
global warming concerns (Leiserowitz et al., 2013). Other critics are content with the empirical 
evidence that strict environmental regulations and informal institutional pressure in the United 
States have already significantly improved its environment (Chay & Greenstone, 2003; Levinson, 
2009; Shapiro & Walker, 2014). Significant portions of Americans still think their government 
should not take responsibility for other countries’ environmental problems. 
We challenge these critical views by proposing that the United States’ strict regulations and 
institutional pressure for environmental performance might come at the expense of the 
environment in other countries. According to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (hereafter PHH), 
―liberalized trade in goods will lead to the relocation of pollution intensive production from high 
income and stringent environmental regulation countries to low income and lax environmental 
regulation countries‖ (Taylor, 2005). For example, a recent study in China using atmospheric 
modeling found that 17%–36% of four major anthropogenic air pollutants (SO2, NOx, CO, and 
black carbon) emitted in that country are associated with the production of goods for export, and 
that about 21% of export-related emissions are attributable to goods destined for the United 
States (Lin et al., 2014). Unfortunately, most prior research on PHH has relied on aggregate 
country-, state-, or industry-level information (Antweiler, Copeland, & Taylor, 2001; Ederington, 
Levinson, & Minier, 2004; Grossman & Krueger, 1995; Hanna, 2010; Levinson, 2010, 2009), 
which partly explains some contradictory results in this research. To our knowledge, no one has 
studied the issue at the level of the firm, where production-pollution decisions are made. 
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To fill this gap, this paper brings a firm-strategy analysis to the policy debate. In response to 
institutional pressure, such as that for environmental performance, firms can acquiesce (e.g., 
comply), compromise, avoid, defy, or manipulate (Oliver, 1991). While compliance by a firm 
―elevates its legitimacy and protects it from public criticism and the financial penalties of 
noncompliance‖ (Oliver, 1991: 153), strict legal and institutional requirements impose 
significant compliance costs on firms (Blass et al., 2014). In order to lower compliance costs, 
firms can compromise by innovating products and processes (King & Lenox, 2001; Porter & 
Van der Linde, 1995) or manipulate (e.g., by greenwashing, Kim & Lyon, 2015). These 
strategies, however, are constrained by societal scrutiny (Marquis & Toffel, 2014) or firm 
capabilities (Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Berchicci, Dowell, & King, 2012). We conjecture that 
firms may also lower the compliance costs by arbitraging between varying institutional 
constraints, effectively putting ―sovereignty at bay‖ (Kobrin, 2001; Vernon, 1971). For example, 
firms can redesign their supply chain, shifting their domestic production to cleaner segments and 
import from poor or low-wage countries (LWCs) products that are more polluting to produce, 
thereby achieving compliance and avoidance at the same time. Even though the comparative 
advantage of LWCs should attract more labor-intensive industries rather than the more polluting 
capital-intensive industries (Cole & Elliott, 2005), LWCs also have lax environmental standards 
and poor environmental regulatory quality (Esty & Porter, 2002), which attract foreign 
businesses based on environmental rather than pure labor-cost considerations. 
To test these ideas, we linked firm-level imports and plant-level production statistics 
maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau (Census) to plant-level toxics emissions information from 
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) database. We 
found that domestic plants pollute less on American soil as their parent firm imports more from 
LWCs: When a plant’s parent firm increases its share of imports from LWCs by 10 percentage 
points, the plant’s toxic emissions on American soil fall by 4%–6%. We then explored a few 
micro-mechanisms and uncovered evidence consistent with the PHH and a ―pollution-offshoring‖ 
strategy. In particular, we found that goods imported by U.S. firms from LWCs are in more 
pollution-intensive industries than goods imported from the rest of the world, and U.S. 
plants shift production to less pollution-intensive industries and spend less on pollution 
abatement when their parent firm imports more from LWCs. Taking this evidence together 
 4 
 
suggests that at least some U.S. firms are offshoring more pollution-intensive production to 
LWCs. 
Pollution offshoring is both costly and risky. We therefore investigated two sources of 
heterogeneity affecting firms’ offshoring decisions. The first source of heterogeneity is the local 
institution. Plants located in communities that are less proactive in opposing pollution will 
pursue less pollution offshoring. In contrast, in places where local institutions proactively combat 
pollution, revealing that a plant pollutes can trigger aggressive responses from the media and 
local communities, followed by additional inspections and potential penalties from local 
governments. Drawing insights from the social activism and environmental justice literature 
(Hiatt, Grandy, & Lee, 2016; King, 2008; Mohai, Pellow, & Roberts, 2009; Pastor, Sadd, & Hipp, 
2001), we conjecture that the negative impact of imports from LWCs on domestic pollution will 
be stronger for American plants located in counties where the local institutions are more 
powerful, such as counties with a more informed (educated) population, a higher voter turnout in 
presidential elections, or a stronger presence of environmental nongovernment organizations like 
the Sierra Club. The second source of heterogeneity we explore is firm capability. Based on the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature (Berchicci et al., 2012; Chin, Hambrick, & 
Treviño, 2013; Dowell, Hart, & Yeung, 2000), we hypothesize that more-capable firms, or firms 
with more productive plants, and firms with more intangible assets such as technological 
capability and brand equity, will have lower costs and more reputational incentive to comply 
with, rather than avoid, strict environmental requirements in the United States. Therefore, the 
negative impact of imports from LWCs on domestic pollution will be weaker for more-capable 
plants and plants with more-capable parent firms. Our empirical results support these conjectures. 
This paper’s main contribution is to introduce a firm-strategy perspective to the policy debate 
about global coordination to combat environmental problems. It provides the first micro-level 
empirical evidence that the ―green shift‖ of U.S. manufacturing corresponds with a ―brown shift‖ 
of imports from poor countries. It advances the PHH by pointing out an important mechanism of 
intensive-margin/strategic adjustments (e.g., product portfolio reconfiguration) at the firm level, 
which has not been previously distinguished from extensive-margin adjustments (e.g., firm entry 
and exit) at the industry or regional level. These findings imply that, with the globalization of 
production, adopting strict domestic environmental standards can relieve negative externalities in 
one location while amplifying them in another location.  With the recent public debates around 
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re- or near-shoring vs. offshoring, the impact of institutional constraints on the configuration of 
global production networks becomes increasingly salient. While conventional wisdom assumes 
that pollution is local, a recent study shows that pollution from China contributes to a significant 
portion of the sulfate concentrates found over the western United States (Lin et al., 2014). Our 
empirical findings lend further credence to policy makers’ assertions that there should be more 
coordination between international trade and environmental agreements (Keller & Levinson, 
2002). 
In addition, this paper highlights the role of local institutions and firm capability in 
explaining firm’s choice of arbitraging in institutional differences. While the idea of institutional 
arbitrage is not new, existing studies have been limited to multinational corporations (MNCs) 
and institutional constraints with no clear CSR consequence. Our findings, based on the most 
comprehensive sample of manufacturing firms, suggest that firms could respond to institutional 
pressure by compliance at the local level but avoidance at the global level. Our goal is not to 
offer any moral endorsement for or against a ―jurisdiction shopping‖ strategy (Ahuja & 
Yayavaram, 2011), but to demonstrate that such a strategy is conceptually possible and 
practically feasible. At the same time, we point out that a firm’s capability influences the costs 
and benefits of embracing CSR initiatives in its home country, and therefore influences its 
decision about offshoring and environmental strategy. 
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Institutions are humanly devised constraints that structure human interactions; they include 
formal rules as well as informal norms of behavior and conventions (North, 1990). Institutions 
can be both supportive and detrimental to organizations. On the one hand, institutions provide (1) 
information, which enables better monitoring and measuring of effort and performance, and (2) 
clarity of property rights and ―rules of the game,‖ which facilitate enforcement (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972; Coase, 1937; Demsetz, 1967). Accordingly, strong institutions promote 
economic growth (North 1990). On the other hand, institutions can be developed independent of 
efficiency and diffused through coercive, mimetic, and normative processes (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Because organizations require legitimacy to survive and 
thrive (Weber, 1924), institutions exert powerful pressure on firms to conform (Orru, Biggart, & 
Hamilton, 1991).  
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Institutions vary not only by their strength and benefits/costs to organizations, but also by 
time and space. This variation creates an opportunity for organizations to arbitrage across 
institutional boundaries. In a closed social system, firms must comply with institutional demands 
despite the high cost of compliance. Globalization relaxes this local constraint and allows firms 
to arbitrage between varying local institutions. For example, firms can circumvent trade barriers 
through foreign direct investment (Caves, 1996) or evade tax liability by relocating operations to 
low-tax countries (Desai et al. 2004).  
 
Arbitraging between environmental standards 
Pollution is a negative externality. By partially privatizing its social costs, strict environmental 
standards raise firms production costs, which should in turn discourage pollution-intensive 
production. However, the impact of strict environmental standards on U.S. firms has been 
controversial in policy and academic debates. Many argue that strict environmental standards in 
the United States weaken American firms’ competitiveness in international markets, causing 
declining manufacturing productivity (Greenstone, List, & Syverson, 2012), plant closures 
(Becker & Henderson, 2000; Henderson, 1996), losses of American jobs (Greenstone, 2002), and 
falling wages for U.S. workers (Walker, 2013).  
While the literature often separately studies the two main responses to environmental 
standards—compliance or avoidance—we argue that firms can achieve compliance and 
avoidance by arbitraging between different institutional requirements. For example, it has been 
found that, in response to the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), firms use air pollution 
abatement techniques to remove pollutants from the air, but release these pollutants into water 
bodies, landfills, or the ground (Greenstone, 2003). In addition, firms operating multiple 
facilities across multiple jurisdictions in the United States generate more total waste (King & 
Shaver, 2001). 
Globalization provides an additional dimension along which firms can arbitrage. Whereas the 
annual cost of complying with environmental standards in the Unites States amounts to hundreds 
of billions of dollars and more than two percent of GDP, most less developed countries spend 
only a fraction of one percent (Jaffe et al., 1995) and have not been able to adopt strict 
environmental standards for fear of hurting economic growth (The Economist, 1998). Such 
differences create a unique arbitrage opportunity for firms from rich countries. For example, U.S. 
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firms invested more outside the United States when they expected their county to be subject to 
more stringent environmental regulations (Hanna, 2010). The concern over ―job killing‖ 
environmental regulations in the United States is one major obstacle to trade agreements such as 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Here we propose an intensive-margin 
adjustment mechanism within firms that is consistent with the PHH: adjusting production sites. 
More specifically, firms can redesign their supply chain to locate more-polluting production in 
LWCs to ―avoid‖ U.S. pollution standards, while assigning their domestic plants to produce in 
cleaner segments to ―comply‖ with the U.S. standards. Accordingly: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A U.S. plant will emit less pollution as its parent firm imports more from 
LWCs relative to non-LWC countries. 
 
Local institutions and global response 
Firms are subject to national regulations as well as local informal institutional pressures. 
Powerful local news media and activists can exert significant impact on firms (Hiatt et al., 2016; 
King, 2008). They can mobilize voter turnout to influence regulatory changes that would impose 
an economic penalty on non-conforming firms (Tarrow, 2011). For example, when Butler 
County, Pennsylvania, was identified by the EPA as among the dirtiest counties, local residents 
successfully pressured the state to restrict nitrate emissions of a major steel plant before the plant 
was allowed to release waste into the Connoquenessing Creek (Powers, 2013). Local residents 
can also engage in protests, civil suits, and letter-writing campaigns to impose operational costs 
such as legal fees and public relations expenses, to distract managerial attention, or to threaten 
the firm’s reputation amongst its customers, employees, and shareholders (Eesley & Lenox, 
2006). After Calhoun County, Texas, was publicized by the EPA as one of the dirtiest counties in 
America, local residents organized various awareness programs to inform the public about local 
pollution. Under public pressure, Alcoa had to commit to aggressive pollution reduction 
initiatives at two local plants (Powers, 2013).  
Some counties are more tolerant of noncompliance, or are less able to mobilize opposition to 
noncompliance than others. Noncomplying firms in these counties are therefore less likely to 
relocate elsewhere (including relocating out of the country). This dynamic contributes to 
environmental inequality, such as the discriminatory siting of toxic facilities in the United States 
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(Mohai et al., 2009; Pastor et al., 2001). Consistently, both anecdotal and empirical evidence has 
shown that U.S. counties with more informed (educated) population and with greater voter 
turnout in presidential elections have fewer toxic facilities located in them (Shapiro, 2005), and 
these counties are more likely to force firms to cut emissions or relocate production (Hoffman & 
Ocasio, 2001; Khanna, Quimio, & Bojilova, 1998; Maxwell, Lyon, & Hackett, 2000). Another 
important player is non-government social movement organizations such as the Sierra Club, 
which can engage their members to frame and influence individual values and stakeholder 
understandings, thereby affecting firm decisions (Hiatt, 2010). 
Compared within increasingly powerful state and county stakeholders in the United States, 
communities in LWCs have less power against their governments due to both a lack of 
information and a lack of property rights. They might also have different incentives, as their 
basic economic needs have yet to be met. This results in more lenient environmental standards 
and lighter local institutional pressure for environmental performance in LWCs. Therefore, firms 
with their American plants located in counties that are expected to react more aggressively to 
toxic emissions will be more likely to offshore to LWCs.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The negative impact of imports from LWCs on domestic pollution will be 
stronger for U.S. plants located in counties where the local institutions are more powerful. 
 
Firm capability and offshoring 
Despite the higher costs, fulfilling CSR objectives by complying with (rather than avoiding) 
institutional requirements brings potential benefits for some firms. Firms that adopt strong 
environmental management have been found to enjoy greater accounting returns (Hart & Ahuja, 
1996; Nehrt, 1996; Russo & Fouts, 1997) or higher financial returns (Dowell et al., 2000; 
Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996) or both (King & Lenox, 2002). This is because socially 
responsible firms can potentially deter stakeholder activism (Reinhardt, 1999), attract consumers 
(Casadesus-Masanell et al., 2009; Elfenbein & McManus, 2010; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001; 
Servaes & Tamayo, 2013) and motivate productive employees (Flammer, 2015; Greening & 
Turban, 2000; Prendergast, 2007; Tonin & Vlassopoulos, 2015), thereby enhancing shareholder 
value (Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014; Porter & Kramer, 2011).  
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Firms’ incentive to arbitrage institutional differences depends on the costs and benefits of 
avoidance relative to those of compliance. These costs and benefits are partly driven by firm 
capability. Whereas less-capable firms often find it challenging to meet environmental standards, 
more-capable firms will find it relative easy to remain profitable while achieving or even 
outperforming these standards. For some capable firms, such as firms with more productive 
plants, the cost of compliance is lower. These firms are more likely to be at the technological 
frontier and will find it less costly to innovate their products and processes, thereby enjoying 
more ―environmental capability‖ (Berchicci et al., 2012). They are also more likely to have 
accumulated slack resources necessary to undertake CSR (Chin et al., 2013).  
For other capable firms, such as firms with a larger amount of intangible assets including 
technological capability and brand equity (Dowell et al., 2000; Morck & Yeung, 1992), 
avoidance brings less benefit but more risk. These firms are likely to enjoy a greater ―stakeholder 
influencing capacity‖ and send a more credible signal by engaging in CSR than firms with less 
brand equity, thereby profiting more from complying. In addition, because they are more likely 
to compete on product differentiation and brand reputation, they will be more cautious about the 
potential damage to their reputation in their home country by socially irresponsible activities 
abroad—the kind of reputational damage that Apple and Nike experienced in recent years (Wall 
Street Journal, 2013, 2014). Furthermore, these firms are less likely to compete based on 
production costs and therefore will be under less cost pressure when making offshoring and 
environmental decisions. We therefore expect more productive plants and firms with more 
intangible assets to engage in less pollution offshoring.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The negative impact of imports from LWCs on domestic pollution will be 
weaker for more productive U.S. plants, U.S. plants of more productive parent firms, and U.S. 
plants of parent firms that own more intangible assets.  
 
THE U.S. ENVIRONMENT AND IMPORTS FROM LWCS 
The EPA’s TRI program is the first large-scale initiative to track facility-level pollution 
emissions in the United States. Introduced by the Emergency Planning and Community Right to 
Know Act (EPCRA) in 1986, the TRI program intends to provide public environmental 
information and to affect firm behavior indirectly through consumer, public, or community 
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pressure (Konar & Cohen, 1997).
1
 The TRI database has also become one of the most widely 
accessed databases providing comparative data on environmental performance across facilities 
and over time. It has been used by a large body of stakeholders including the government, 
investors, potential employees, industry, media, and general public. Prior research shows that 
residential house prices in heavily polluted areas declined after the TRI database was published 
(Oberholzer-Gee & Mitsunari, 2006). Both public media and the stock market respond 
negatively when a firm reports higher emissions in the TRI (Hamilton, 1995). Firms that have 
experienced the deepest stock price declines in response to their TRI reports have subsequently 
reduced emissions more than their industry peers (Konar & Cohen, 1997). In fact, plants that 
report to TRI dropped their total pollutant emissions by about 60% between 1988 and 2005, 
leading the EPA to conclude that the ―national publication of the TRI data by the government, 
followed by analysis by citizens’ groups and the news media, led to action by industry to reduce 
emissions‖ (EPA, 2000; Oberholzer-Gee & Mitsunari, 2006). 
Based on TRI, we constructed an overview of the toxic emissions from U.S. manufacturing 
plants.  Consistent with prior statistics (e.g., Levinson, 2009), Figure 1 shows that the emissions 
of major air pollutants by U.S. manufacturers fell by more than half between 1992 and 2009, 
despite the significant growth in real U.S. manufacturing output.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                                                          
 
1
 The EPA requires facilities that emit more than 25,000 pounds or handle more than 10,000 pounds of any of the 
600+ designated toxic chemicals to self-report emissions data for use in a publicly available database. Although the 
TRI database is based on self-reported information, there are a few mechanisms to ensure its accuracy. First, each 
EPA region has a TRI enforcement program that conducts, on an annual basis, a number of data quality inspections 
(of reporting facilities) and non-reporting inspections (of facilities that are in TRI industries but did not report). 
Violations, whether stemming from late reporting, failure to report, or data quality issues, can lead to penalties of 
$25,000 per day, per chemical, or per violation, and may be subject to criminal charges. Second, a complementary 
self-reporting program, EPA’s Audit Policy program, launched in 1995, reduces or waives certain penalties for 
environmental violations that are voluntarily disclosed to the government by regulated entities. Such self-reports are 
found to help regulators identify self-policing firms and reallocate enforcement resources to firms that do not self-
report (Toffel & Short, 2011). These enforcement mechanisms give firms incentive to self-report. 
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In comparison to Figure 1, we plotted the overall trends in imports in Figure 2 based on 
Census’ aggregate trade statistics. Figure 2 shows that while imports from LWCs have been 
small historically, they have increased substantially in recent years as trade barriers have been 
removed. Between 1992 and 2009, when the real value of total U.S. imports more than doubled, 
the real value of imports from LWCs grew more than ten-fold. Consequently, the share of total 
U.S. imports from LWCs in this period rose from 7% to about 23%. The increasing share of 
imports from LWCs in Figure 2 corresponds to the decreasing air pollution in Figure 1.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 3 shows that between 1992 and 2009, those industries that had a greater increase in 
the share of imports from LWCs also experienced a greater reduction in air pollutant emissions 
from U.S. plants. For example, industries that experienced the greatest increase in imports from 
LWCs were in the sectors of printing (SIC 278), apparel and textile (SICs 235 and 238), rubber 
and plastics (SIC302), and furniture (SICs 251, 254, and 259); all experienced some of the 
largest drops in air pollution emissions. In contrast, industries that had the least increase in 
imports from LWCs due to transportation costs or trade barriers, including industries in the 
sectors of food (SIC 208), stone, clay, and glass products (SIC 325), and tobacco products (SIC 
214), experienced the least improvement in air pollution emissions. Together, figures 1 through 3 
suggest a potential substitution effect between imports from LWCs and domestic emissions at 
the national and industry levels. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
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Our empirical tests combine firm-level trade, plant-level production, and plant-level pollution 
data, an approach that offers several benefits. First, it fills a gap in prior research about the 
impact of globalization on the environment, which is mostly at the country, state, and industry 
levels due to data limitation. Second, it allows us to control for multiple alternative explanations 
for environmental performance such as scale of production, capital intensity, skilled labor 
requirement, and pollution abatement at the plant level. Finally, it allows us to examine the 
impact of different local institutions and productivity on individual plants within the same firm.  
 
Samples, data sources, and variables 
We constructed our samples from several sources. Our first data source is the plant-level toxic 
emissions data published in the EPA’s TRI database, which contains approximately 80,000 
facility-chemical reports from more than 20,000 different plants. Toffel and Marshall (2004) 
compare 13 methods of aggregating chemical-specific release data to the plant level and 
recommend EPA’s Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) model as the most 
comprehensive model for estimating the impacts of toxic releases on local residents’ human 
health. The RSEI model estimates the toxicity weight for each chemical based on its toxicity, its 
fate and transport through the environment after its release, the route (inhalation and oral) and 
extent of human exposure, and its single most sensitive adverse effect (cancer and non-cancer) 
(EPA, 2012).  
We used the TRI database and the RSEI model to construct several variables. The first 
variable, toxic emissions, gauges the total plant-level toxic emissions.
2
 An alternative measure 
using the total toxicity-weighted emissions scaled by plant output generated similar results. The 
second group of variables is to measure the toxic content of a firm’s imports. We summed the 
RSEI-based toxic emissions of all plants in each 4-digit SIC industry in 1992 and divided the 
sum by the total output from that industry in 1992, based on the NBER-CES Manufacturing 
Industry Database (Bartelsman & Gray, 1996), to derive a pollution intensity measure for that 
industry. We then summed a firm’s import value in each industry, weighted by the industry’s 
                                                          
 
2
 We followed recent studies using the RSEI model to define toxic emissions from a plant as its all-media release of 
designated toxic chemicals, multiplied by the RSEI toxicity weight for each chemical; emissions to air are weighted 
using inhalation toxicity and emissions to other media are weighted using oral toxicity (Gamper-Rabindran, 2006). 
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pollution intensity, to derive the firm’s toxic imports, which measures the toxic content of a 
firm’s imports. We also scaled toxic imports using the firm’s total imports to derive (toxic 
imports/total imports), which measures the pollution intensity of a firm’s imports. 3  We 
constructed the third group of variables with a similar methodology: We summed a plant’s 
output in each industry, weighted by the industry’s pollution intensity, to derive the overall 
pollution content and intensity of a plant’s output, toxic output and (toxic output/plant shipment), 
respectively. As a robustness check, we constructed alternative measures of toxic imports and 
toxic output using the World Bank’s ―Industrial Pollution Projection System‖ (IPPS); results 
were similar. Finally, we constructed three variables from TRI to capture plant-level operational 
efforts in reducing pollution. They include the number of pollution prevention (P2) practices 
such as operational and procedural changes and material, equipment and product changes 
(Harrington, Deltas, & Khanna, 2014), and total tonnage of production waste. 
Our second data source is plant-level micro data from the U.S. Census. It is used (1) to 
control for other factors that might influence pollution emissions, such as plant size (plant 
output),
4
 capital expenditures, and share of non-production workers over the entire workforce 
(skill intensity, which can also proxy for the plant’s production technology), (2) to derive the 
overall pollution intensity of a plant’s output, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, and (3) to 
calculate the cost of fuel consumption per unit of output as a measure of energy efficiency that 
could potentially explain the change in plant-level pollution emissions. The Census micro data 
on manufacturing plants include the Census of Manufactures (CM) and the Annual Survey of 
Manufactures (ASM). CM data are collected during the economic census, which takes place in 
years ending in 2 and 7 and covers approximately 350,000 manufacturing plants each time. The 
ASM typically samples about 60,000 plants in non-census years. All plants with more than 250 
employees and all plants of large firms are included by design. Some 40,000 other plants are 
                                                          
 
3
 This measure of pollution intensity is based on each industry’s emission per dollar of output in the United States. 
Ideally, we should use pollution intensity in the exporting countries. However, information about industry-level 
pollution intensity in most countries does not exist. Using U.S. pollution intensity as a proxy for pollution intensity 
of imported goods is a common practice in the literature (Levinson, 2009). Such a measure assumes that the 
ordering of industries based on pollution intensity overseas is the same as in the US. For example, we are assuming 
the primary metal industry is more polluting per dollar of output than the food industry in both the US and LWCs 
because the underlying technology is similar.  
4
 Using alternative measure of scale, such as employment, returns similar results. 
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selected with a probability proportional to a composite measure of their size. Once a plant is 
surveyed, the ASM continues surveying it to form a five-year panel. We linked the Census and 
TRI datasets using the existing bridge files maintained by the Census for 1992–99 and by manual 
matching using plant names and addresses for subsequent years. 
Our third data source is the U.S. Census’ Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database 
(LFTTD). The database covers all transactions of goods that crossed U.S. borders. For each 
transaction, the database contains a firm identifier and pertinent details of the transaction, as well 
as a 10-digit Harmonized System (HS) classification code of the product category. We followed 
Pierce and Schott (2012) by linking the ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) classifications to the 
1987 version of four-digit SICs. To identify imports from LWCs, we relied on a list provided by 
Bernard et al. (2006), who classify a country as an LWC if its average annual GDP per capita 
was less than 5% of the U.S. annual GDP per capita in 1972–92. A list of LWCs is provided in 
Table 1. China, India, and most African countries are on the list. We calculated a firm’s LWC 
import share as the percentage of its total imports that originated from LWCs.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Our fourth data source is the plant-level Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) 
survey provided by U.S. Census, which is the most comprehensive survey of environmental 
abatement costs in the United States. Abatement costs include pollution prevention, pollution 
treatment (to reduce or eliminate pollution that has been generated during production processes), 
waste recycling, and disposal. We used the PACE surveys for the years when they are available 
in our sample period: 1992–1994, 1999, and 2005. We used total Pollution Abatement Operating 
Costs, which comprise salaries and wages, parts and materials, fuel and electricity, capital 
depreciation, contract work, equipment leasing, and additional operating costs associated with 
the abatement of air and water pollution as well as solid waste reduction or disposal.  
Finally, we complemented our firm- and plant-level data with state-level Sierra Club 
membership information and county-level demographic information (college education and voter 
turnout) based on the U.S. Census’ American Community Survey. We also matched parent firms 
that are publicly listed to the Compustat dataset in order to collect information about their 
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intangible assets (i.e., technological capability measured using RND expenditure and brand 
equity measured using advertising expenditure, see Morck & Yeung, 1992). 
Our main sample is the intersection of plants’ pollution data from TRI, plants’ operating 
information from ASM and CM, and firm’s import importation from LFTTD. This sample 
contains about 18,000 plants of more than 8,000 U.S. parent firms for a total of 137,000 plant–
year observations in 1992–2009. Table 2 provides summary statistics for this sample. An average 
importing firm sources 16% of its manufacturing imports from LWCs, slightly higher than the 
national average of 15% that we calculated based on Census’ aggregate trade statistics. The skill 
intensity variable has a mean of 0.35; that is, non-production workers’ salaries account for about 
35% of an average plant’s total salaries. The sample plants are relatively large: A typical plant 
has about 418 employees and manufactures a total value of $175 million of output. A separate 
calculation reveals that plants in our sample accounted for more than 80% of all U.S. 
manufacturing plants’ total toxic emissions in the sample period. 
  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 3 reports the pairwise correlation among our key variables of interest. It shows that a 
plant’s toxic emission is negatively correlated with its parent firm’s share of imports from LWCs, 
but positively related to the plant’s size, capital expenditures, and total volume of imports. These 
simple correlation statistics foreshadow our subsequent multivariate regression results. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Specifications 
We mainly used the following specification to estimate toxic emissions at the plant level: 
   toxic emission            LWC import share               1  
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where                       , the logarithm of the total toxicity-weighted emissions  of plant i of 
parent firm j in year t, and LWC import share
  
, the share of imports from LWCs for firm parent 
firm j in year t, are defined as before.      is a vector of control variables that include the 
logarithm of plant output, the logarithm of its capital expenditures, and the skill intensity. We 
also controlled for the parent firm’s total imports. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
We then modified the specification in Equation 1 in two ways. First, we investigated 
alternative dependent variables. They include plants’ toxic output, a number of measures of the 
plants’ efforts to reduce pollution such as abatement costs and pollution prevention practices, etc. 
Second, we added local institutional pressure, plant/firm capability, and their interaction terms 
with LWC import share to explore the additional impact of local institutions and firm capability. 
We also ran a separate firm-level regression to estimate the pollution intensity of industries in 
which U.S. firms import goods from LWCs. 
 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Imports from LWCs and domestic pollution 
Table 4 reports our main results based on Equation 1. All columns include plant fixed effects. In 
addition, columns (1) and (6) include year fixed effects, and columns (2)–(5) include 
industry*year fixed effects to control for changes in industry-specific technology and reductions 
in trade costs over time. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The results are qualitatively similar across all columns. They show that a firm’s LWC import 
share was significantly and negatively correlated with its domestic plants’ toxic emissions; 
results for toxic emissions per dollar of shipment are not shown due to space limit but were 
similar. The economic effect of the point estimates is considerable. For instance, the coefficient 
of –0.401 in column (2) implies that a 10% increase in a plant’s parent firm’s LWC import share 
is correlated with about 4% reduction in the plant’s toxic emissions. Our results imply that, over 
the 18-year sample period, when the economy-wide share of imports from LWCs grew by 16 
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percentage points, a plant would reduce its toxic emission by about 6.4%, a reduction that 
accounts for around 10% of the total drop in U.S. toxic emissions in the period. Coefficients on 
other explanatory variables are consistent with our expectation. In general, larger plants, plants 
with larger capital expenditures, and plants with a larger proportion of production workers 
tended to produce greater toxic emissions. Finally, result show total imports did not have a 
statistically significant impact on toxic emissions and including it did not qualitatively change 
the coefficients of LWC import share. H1 is supported. 
 
Robustness checks. One might wonder how much of the pollution-import effect is caused by 
imports from China. Results in column (3) suggest that imports from China indeed played a 
significant role, whereas imports from EU countries did not have a significant impact. That said, 
column (4) suggests that even after excluding China, LWC imports had a significant, albeit 
weaker, correlation with domestic pollution at the plant level. We also estimated column (2) on 
the two subsample periods before and after 2001, when China joined the WTO. Our main results 
held in both periods. We also ran a robustness check replacing imports from LWCs with imports 
from the ―most polluting countries‖ based on countries’ CO2 emission per GDP using the World 
Development Indicators; results are consistent.
5
 
In column (5) we used an alternative measure of toxic emission following King and Lenox 
(2000). The alternative measure weights each chemical by its toxicity using the Reportable 
Quantities (RQ) provided by the EPA in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). RQ serves as a threshold for reporting accidental 
spills, therefore the toxicity weight for each chemical is calculated as the inverse of its RQ. The 
coefficients in column (5) show that our main findings hold with this alternative measure of 
                                                          
 
5
 In order to identify countries with lax environmental standards independent of economic development or wage 
level, we first constructed a list of ―most polluting countries‖ (MPCs). We ranked countries by their annual carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emission (kilograms per inflation-adjusted GDP), one of the World Development Indicators (World-
Bank, 2010) Such measures have been used in prior studies (Levinson, 2009) to proxy the strength of environmental 
regulation across countries. We chose the minimum level of CO2 emissions by the top-tercile countries, 1 kilogram 
per dollar GDP, as the threshold. A country is categorized as one of the most polluting countries if its 1992–2009 
average CO2 emissions exceeded 1 kilogram per GDP. The list shows that a few countries from Eastern Europe and 
the Middle East (presumably fossil fuel burners) stand out as different from LWCs.  
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emissions. We also scaled the dependent variables by the plant output and lagged the 
independent variables; results are similar. 
 
Endogeneity. Despite our efforts to control for determinants of pollution, there could be 
some unobservable variables that bias our estimates. Two obvious candidates for such 
unobservable factors are regulation and technology. Firms may be reducing pollution in the 
United States due to more strict environmental regulations or because they have developed new 
technologies to reduce pollution; at the same time, they may be increasing imports from LWCs 
due to increased U.S. demand for LWC products. These unobservable factors might affect a 
firm’s decision to import and emit and thus induce a correlation between the right-hand-side variables 
and the error term.  
To address the problem of omitted variables, we first used a longitudinal, rather than cross-
sectional, analysis based on a panel of plant-level dataset. In addition, we included plant and 
industry-year fixed effects to account for unobservable time-invariant factors at the plant-level 
(such as plant innovativeness and technological capability) and industry-specific yearly events 
that would affect pollution (such as industry-specific regulatory change, technological progress, 
or tariff changes). Furthermore, we adopted an instrument-variable (IV) strategy.  
We instrumented for the firm-level share of imports from LWCs using the industry-level 
contemporaneous Chinese exports to eight non-U.S. OECD countries, following the method 
suggested by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013).
6
 A significant proportion of the growth in LWC 
exports over our sample period was driven by Chinese exports. China’s transition to a market-
oriented economy, including lowering trade barriers, an abundant supply of labor released from 
urbanization, comprehensive policy reforms, and accession to the WTO, contributed to a 
substantial increase in China’s manufacturing competitiveness. We therefore expected industries 
that experienced exports from China to non-U.S. OECD countries to have also experienced more 
imports from LWCs in the U.S. However, the increase in exports from China to non-U.S. OECD 
countries mainly reflects a ―supply shock‖ driven by China’s manufacturing competitiveness. It 
                                                          
 
6
 These eight other developed countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and 
Switzerland. Please refer to Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) for a detailed description of this approach. 
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is therefore less likely to be correlated with demand-side shocks in the United States or U.S. 
regulation and technology.    
We use data from the United Nation Comrade Database on imports to construct the IV as 
follows: 
 
            ∑ 
    
   
     
   
̃
  2  
     
   
̃
 
     
    
  3 , 
 
where      is the value of imports by firm i in industry j at year t and     is the value of imports by 
firm i at year t.       is imports in the eight non-U.S. OECD countries from China in industry j 
and year t.      is total imports in the eight non-U.S. OECD countries from all countries in 
industry j and year t. We report the two-stage least square (2SLS) results using the IV in column 
(6) of Table 4. The coefficients are consistent with those in column (1).  
 
Mechanisms. While Table 4 suggests that imports from LWCs reduced U.S. plants’ pollution 
emissions, it does not prove a substitution effect between pollution in the United States and 
pollution in LWCs. A few mechanisms can be at play. We explore these mechanisms in the next 
few paragraphs. 
First, it could be that as U.S. firms import cheaper products from LWCs, their costs decrease 
and profit increase. The increased profits would enable U.S. firms to finance more environmental 
projects. If this were the case, we should see U.S. plants spend more on pollution abatement as 
their parent firm imports more from LWCs. To test this mechanism, we estimated in the first two 
columns of Table 5 the correlation between imports from LWCs and U.S. plants’ expenditures 
on pollution abatement. Because of the significant gaps in time coverage of PACE data, we had 
to use industry*year and plant fixed effects separately but not jointly. In addition to total 
abatement costs, we also estimated abatement costs divided by a plant’s total output; results were 
similar: They refute the mechanism of cheap LWC production resulting in more U.S. 
investments in pollution abatement, thereby reducing plant-level pollution emissions. Instead, 
Columns (1)–(2) in Table 5 show that domestic plants spent less on pollution abatement when 
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their parent firm imported more from LWCs. The coefficient of –0.314 implies that a 10-
percentage-point increase in a plant’s parent firm’s LWC import share reduced a plant’s 
pollution abatement costs by about 3.14%, or about 22,100 nominal dollars, relative to about 
$704,000 spent on abatement by an average plant in our sample.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Following a similar logic, we investigated whether plants increased pollution prevention (P2) 
practices as their parent firm imported more from LWCs. Prior studies have shown that P2 
practices reduce toxic emissions (Harrington et al., 2014). Our results in Column (3) show that 
plants did not significantly step up their P2 practices as their parent firm imported more from 
LWCs. On the other hand, Column (4) shows that plants reduced their production waste. Column 
(5) shows that as a plant’s parent imported more from LWCs, the plant consumed less fuel, 
controlling for total output. However, the reduction in production waste, as shown in Column (4), 
and in fuel consumption, as shown in Column (5), are consistent both with plants investing in 
pollution reduction (without offshoring pollution) and with plants adjusting their product 
portfolio (through offshoring). 
Next, we tested an intensive-margin adjustment mechanism that is consistent with a PHH and 
a pollution-offshoring strategy at the firm level: firms moving high-emission production offshore 
to concentrate domestic production on less-polluting goods and processes. To test this 
mechanism, we first checked if imports from LWCs were more pollution intensive. The 
coefficients in Table 6 show that the pollution content of a firm’s imports was positively and 
significantly related to its LWC import share. Coefficients in column (2) imply that a 10-
percentage-point increase in a firm’s LWC import share is associated with a 2.5% increase in the 
amount of its ―toxic imports.‖ Coefficients in columns (3) and (4) imply that a 10-percentage-
point increase in a firm’s LWC import share is associated with an increase in the pollution 
intensity of its imports of about 0.10, or approximately 20% of the sample’s median value of 
pollution intensity of imports.  
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---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
We then investigated if plants increased their output in cleaner segments relative to their 
output in dirtier segments as their parent imported more from LWCs.
7
 The coefficients in Table 7 
imply that a 10-percentage-point increase in the share of imports from LWCs lowered the 
toxicity-weighted output of a U.S. plant by about 0.3%. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Together, Tables 4–7 provide some evidence of ―pollution offshoring‖ by U.S. firms. They 
imported products in more pollution-intensive industries from LWCs than from rich countries. 
Correspondingly, U.S. plants polluted less on U.S. soil, spent less on pollution abatement, and 
produced more in less-polluting industries.  
   
Local institutions  
Table 8 tests the impact of local institutions. We expanded Equation 1 by adding measures of 
local institutional power in the area where a plant is located and their interactions with LWC 
import share. Results suggest that the negative impact of imports from LWCs on U.S. plants’ 
pollution emission was stronger for plants located in counties with a more educated population, 
counties with stronger voter turnout, and states with a greater membership in Sierra Club. In fact, 
a significant portion of the negative impact of imports from LWCs on domestic pollution seems 
to be driven by the power of local institutions. H2 is supported. 
                                                          
 
7
 Pollution offshoring at the firm level means that either (1) firm changed their plant mix, establishing new plants in 
cleaner industries and closing down plants in dirtier industries, or (2) plants changed their product mix, increasing 
production in cleaner industries and reducing production in dirtier industries. We focused on (2) for two reasons. 
First, our supplementary analyses did not return strong support for (1), partly due to lack of information on exited 
plants. Second, plant closure and establishment would not have explained our plant-level finding in Table 4. 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Firm capability  
Table 9 adds measures of plant and firm capability. In order to present the full model, all 
columns include one measure of local institutional pressure on environmental performance, 
Sierra Club membership, and its interaction with LWC import share. Coefficients to these 
variables are similar to those in Table 8, Column (1), albeit economically larger. Coefficients to 
the capability measures suggest that more productive plants and plants of parent firms with more 
intangible assets (RND and brand equity) pollute less. In addition, the negative impact of imports 
from LWCs on pollution is weaker for more productive plants, plants of more productive parent 
firms, and plants of parent firms that own more intangible assets. H3 is supported. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
In sum, results in Tables 4–9 suggest a potential substitution between pollution-intensive 
production in the United States and such production offshored to LWCs, and these effects are 
stronger for U.S. plants located in counties where local institutions are more powerful but weaker 
for more-capable U.S. firms.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigated the relationship between U.S. firms’ imports from low-wage countries 
and toxic emissions by their domestic plants. Our empirical results suggest that plants released 
fewer toxic emission on American soil when their parent firm imported more from LWCs. In 
addition, goods imported by U.S. firms from LWCs were in more pollution-intensive industries 
than goods imported from the rest of the world. U.S. plants also shifted production to less 
 23 
 
pollution-intensive industries and spent less on pollution abatement when their parent firm 
imported more from LWCs. The negative impact of imports from LWCs on domestic plants’ 
toxic emissions was stronger for plants located in counties where the local institutions were more 
powerful, but weaker when the plants were more productive or when the parent firms possessed 
more intangible assets such as brand equity.  
This paper’s main contribution is to introduce a firm-strategy perspective into the policy debate 
about global coordination to combat environmental problems. It advances the PHH by pointing 
out an important mechanism of intensive-margin/strategic adjustments (e.g., product portfolio 
reconfiguration) at the firm level. It provides the first micro-level empirical evidence of 
―pollution offshoring‖ and calls for more coordination between international trade and 
environmental agreements. In addition, it highlights the role of local institutions and firm 
capabilities in explaining firms’ choice of offshoring and environmental strategy. 
One intriguing question our results raise is how firms ―get away with‖ offshoring pollution. 
We therefore ran a few supplementary analyses to explore any further heterogeneity across firms 
that would influence the relationship between imports from LWCs and domestic pollution. First, 
Dowell, Hart, and Yeung (2000) find that U.S. MNCs adopting a single stringent global 
environmental standard enjoy higher market values in the U.S. stock market. We would expect 
these U.S. MNCs to pursue less pollution-offshoring. Unfortunately we do not have information 
about which U.S. MNCs adopted a single stringent global environmental standard during our 
sample period. As a supplementary analysis, we included an MNC dummy in our regression. We 
did not find a significant difference between MNCs and domestic firms. Our results may be 
different from those in Dowell et al. (2000) for a number of reasons in addition to the lack of 
comparable information about firms’ internal environmental standards. First, we used different 
samples. Whereas Dowell et al.’s used a sample of large and public S&P 500 MNCs for 1994–97, 
we used a more comprehensive sample of more than 8,000 firms and 18,000 plants of all sizes 
and ownership for 1992–2009. Second, we used different econometric models. While Dowell et 
al. (2000) used both cross-sectional and random-effects models to allow for selection as part of 
their theory that countries with lax environmental regulations might attract poorer quality and 
less competitive firms, we used models with firm or plant fixed effects, industry-year effects, and 
an instrumental approach to alleviate endogeneity concerns, in order to test our theory. Whether 
U.S. firms adopting a single stringent global environmental standard pursue less pollution-
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offshoring can be an interesting subject for future research when data on more firms’ 
international environmental standards become available.  
Consumers may be less sensitive to environmental issues in upstream production than 
environmental issues in downstream production. In a second supplementary analysis we explored 
if firms in downstream (less pollution-intensive) industries might procure more upstream (more 
pollution-intensive) products from LWCs. We first checked the relationship between a country’s 
level of development and the ―upstreamness‖ of its industries. Antràs et al. (2012) constructed a 
measure of industry upstreamness (or average distance from final use) and showed that a 
country’s per capita GDP is not statistically related to the upstreamness of its exports. We then 
performed an industry-level, cross-sectional regression and found that the industry upstreamness 
is not statistically correlated with our measure of pollution intensity. For example, both the 
automobile and footwear industries are among the five most downstream industries, but 
automobile manufacturing is very polluting while footwear manufacturing is much less so. 
Finally, we reran our regressions to account for imports in firms’ main and upstream segments, 
respectively. The results indicate no significantly different effects between imports in the main 
and upstream segments.  
In a third supplementary analysis, we examined if firms more visible to their customers 
might find it more difficult to engage in ―pollution offshoring‖ without being caught, and will 
therefore have less incentive to do so. We investigated the impact of brand equity on pollution 
offshoring. We measured brand equity using advertising expenditure at both the industry and 
firm level. Our results are not presented here due to space limitations. They showed that for firms 
in industries with higher brand equity, and firms with higher brand equity themselves, imports 
from LWCs had a less negative impact on plants’ toxic emissions. After controlling for brand 
equity, however, the negative impact of imports from LWCs on pollution is very similar to that 
in our main regressions. 
It is worth emphasizing that we are not claiming nefarious activities by U.S. firms: They 
might just be optimizing and rebalancing their global sourcing network in response to increased 
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costs for domestic environmental compliance.
8
 When adopting a pollution offshoring strategy, 
U.S. firms have not broken any environmental laws in either the United States or their host 
country. LWCs often care too much about maintaining exports and foreign direct investment to 
drive their economic growth to enforce strict environment regulation. For example, until very 
recently India strongly objected to a global climate-change accord, claiming that ―developing 
countries should not be asked to limit their economic growth as a way of fixing a problem that 
was largely created by the others.‖ India has also been reluctant to transit from fossil fuel to 
cleaner forms of energy without significant financial commitment from the rich world (The New 
York Times, 2015). When U.S. firms are in compliance with both U.S. and foreign 
environmental regulations, it is not easy to detect that they follow less stringent environmental 
standards in the host country than in the United States. Besides, U.S. firms may adopt an internal 
practice for their overseas plants that is less strict than U.S. laws but stricter than the laws in the 
developing country, which may make the host-country residents less critical or even appreciative 
of U.S. firms’ practices. 
Still, to the extent that U.S. firms have a choice between the cheaper, pollution-intensive 
goods from LWCs and the more expensive goods produced by domestic suppliers under 
stringent environmental standards, they are making a strategic decision about the private costs of 
production vs. the public (and international) costs of pollution. Unfortunately, it is not always 
easy to correct environmental or labor malpractice by even the most famous MNCs in foreign 
countries. It took Nike almost a decade after the first report of its malpractices to announce that it 
would raise the minimum wage, significantly increase monitoring, adopt U.S. OSHA clean air 
standards in all factories, and create the NGO Fair Labor Association (FLA) (Business Insider, 
2013). Almost twenty years after the first report, problems still persist (Wall Street Journal, 
2014). Foxconn, the Apple supplier that ―has faced a firestorm of international media attention 
over its labor practices in China‖ and ―reportedly improved working conditions there,‖ has 
diversified into other low-wage nations: Malaysia, Mexico, Brazil, Vietnam, Indonesia, where 
labor regulations are more lax (Christian Science Monitor, 2012). With global environment and 
                                                          
 
8
 Alternatively, as more U.S. firms exit pollution-intensive industries, products in these industries might become 
more expensive, causing higher production costs for U.S. firms in the downstream industries. As a robustness check, 
we included the costs of the plant’s material inputs in our regressions; results were similar. 
 26 
 
labor issues still in hot debate at the policy level, it is hard to blame individual firms—a situation 
that begs for policy and regulatory change at a higher level. 
This paper has a few limitations that suggest opportunities for future study. First, we do not 
directly test the net impact of globalization on the environment in LWCs. On the one hand, 
offshoring by U.S. firms in more pollution-intensive industries can increase the size of pollution-
intensive production in LWCs, exacerbating the pollution problem. On the other hand, offshoring 
by U.S. firms might bring to LWCs more advanced environmental technologies relative to what 
LWCs would have used without globalization, thereby causing less pollution for the same 
magnitude of production. A more comprehensive analysis of the impact of globalization on the 
environment in LWCs can be pursued when such data becomes available.  
In addition, our main analyses do not differentiate between in-house offshoring and global 
outsourcing. In fact more than 80% of jobs in labor-intensive industries such as textiles were 
outsourced, avoiding labor and environmental regulations and hence offering lower costs 
(Christian Science Monitor, 2012). Another example is Apple, which employs 60,000 staff but 
relies on an additional 700,000 people by subcontracting its production (New York Times, 2012). 
On the one hand, offshoring pollution-intensive production to firms’ own subsidiaries in LWCs 
provides better control by the U.S. parent firm and enables the overseas subsidiaries to self-
regulate in accordance with their internal standards (Christmann & Taylor, 2001; Dowell et al., 
2000). On the other hand, subcontracting pollution-intensive production to independent 
contractors helps insulate firms from the potential liabilities and reputational damage in cases 
where something goes wrong. In order to shed light on these opposing theoretical expectations, 
we explored differences between imports from related parties (foreign subsidiaries or affiliates of 
MNCs) and imports from independent third parties. Imports are categorized in the LFTTD 
database as being from related parties if the importer owns, controls, or holds voting power 
equivalent to at least 6% of the outstanding voting stock or shares of the exporter. Our results 
suggest that firms’ imports from related parties in LWCs do not have a statistically different 
correlation with domestic emissions than firms’ imports from independent parties in LWCs. On 
average, in our sample, the imports from related parties in LWCs accounted for less than 1% of a 
firm’s total imports. Therefore, the economic significance of importing from related parties in 
LWCs remains small; the environmental effects of importing from LWCs are primarily driven by 
imports from arm’s length transactions with unrelated parties.  
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In sum, this paper highlights the relationship between firms’ offshoring strategy and their 
environmental performance in the United States. In addition to the theoretical contributions 
highlighted herein, the paper provides plant-level, empirical evidence of offshoring, pollution, 
abatement, and product-mix adjustments using a unique data set of a large sample of U.S. firms 
and plants. It will, we hope, encourage more empirical studies to complement both the extensive 
efforts in the literature on global manufacturing and environmental strategies and the heated 
policy debates on the sustainability of globalization. 
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Figure 1. Pollution and output from U.S. manufacturing, 1992–2009. 
Notes. This figure shows air pollution (solid line) and real output (dashed line) from the U.S. 
manufacturing sector in 1992–2009, where we normalized the 1992 value to be 1. (A) Total release of 
fugitive and stack air from all manufacturing facilities in TRI. (B) Total release of toxic content in 
fugitive and stack air from all manufacturing facilities in TRI. (C) Emission of CO from industrial 
activities in National Emissions Inventory. (D) Emission of SO2 from industrial activities in National 
Emissions Inventory.  
 
 
Figure 2. U.S. imports and imports from LWCs, 1992–2009. 
Notes. Figure 2A shows total value of U.S. imports (dotted line), imports from non-LWCs (dashed line), 
and imports from LWCs (solid line) in 1992–2009, where we normalized the 1992 value of imports to be 
1. Figure 2B plots the fraction of imports originating from LWCs (solid line, left y-axis) in 1992-2009. 
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Figure 3. Changes in imports from LWCs and changes in toxic air emissions, 1992–2009. 
Notes. This figure shows the changes in each industry’s toxic air emissions [toxicity-weighted release] in 
1992–2009 against changes in the share of imports [expressed in decimal] from LWCs. The 1992 value 
for toxic air emissions is normalized to be 1. [A] Based on pounds of emissions. [B] Based on toxicity- 
weighted pounds of emissions. 
 
Table 1.  List of low-wage countries 
Afghanistan  China  India  Pakistan 
Albania  Comoros  Kenya  Rwanda 
Angola  Congo  Lao PDR  Samoa 
Armenia Equatorial Guinea  Lesotho  Sao Tome 
Azerbaijan Eritrea  Madagascar  Sierra Leone 
Bangladesh  Ethiopia  Malawi  Somalia 
Benin  Gambia  Maldives  Sri Lanka 
Bhutan  Georgia Mali  St. Vincent 
Burkina Faso  Ghana  Mauritania Sudan 
Burundi  Guinea  Moldova Togo 
Cambodia Guinea-Bissau Mozambique  Uganda 
Central African Republic  Guyana  Nepal  Vietnam 
Chad  Haiti  Niger Yemen 
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Table 2.  Summary statistics for key variables (main sample)  
 
 
Mean SD 
(1) Ln(Toxic emissions) 12.98 6.09 
(2) LWC import share (Parent firm’s share of imports from LWCs) 0.16 0.19 
(3) Plant’s total value of shipment (in million dollars) 175 586 
(4) Skill intensity 0.35 0.19 
(5) Total capital expenditures (in million dollars) 6.13 36.0 
(6) Parent firm’s total imports (in million dollars) 711 3200 
N=136K. 
Table 3.  Correlation matrix  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) 
(1) Ln(Toxic emissions) 1.00 
  
    
(2) LWC import share -0.07* 1.00 
 
    
(3) Plant’s total value of shipment (in million dollars) 0.18* -0.06* 1.00     
(4) Skill intensity -0.09* 0.01* -0.10* 1.00    
(5) Total capital expenditures (in million dollars) 0.18* -0.08* 0.65* -0.03* 1.00   
(6) Parent firm’s total imports (in million dollars) 0.08* -0.03* 0.34* -0.03* 0.25* 1.00  
N=136K. *p<0.01. 
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Table 4. Firms’ imports from LWCs and their U.S. plants’ toxic emissions 
 Ln(Toxic emission) Ln(Toxic emission) 
Ln(RQ 
emission) 
Ln(Toxic emission) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 2SLS 
LWC import share -0.583 -0.401   -0.112
f  
 [0.143] [0.130]   [0.063]  
Import share from China   -0.348
 c 
   
   [0.146]    
Import share from EU   0.029
d 
   
   [0.075]    
LWC import share, excluding China    -0.548
 
  
    [0.191]   
LWC import share, instrumented      -0.772
h 
      [0.374] 
Ln(Plant output) 0.449
 
0.451
 
0.451 0.452 0.238 0.450 
 [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.025] [0.015] [0.035] 
Skill intensity -0.778
 
-0.703
 
-0.702 -0.708 -0.381 -0.786 
 [0.154] [0.150] [0.150] [0.104] [0.060] [0.155] 
Ln(Capital expenditures) 0.056
 
0.047
 
0.047 0.047 0.023 0.056 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.004] [0.009] 
Ln(Total imports) 0.022
a 
0.025
b
 0.025
e
 0.023 0.008
g
 0.022
i
 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.007] [0.004] [0.011] 
Ln(Total imports/Plant output]   
    
       
Year FE Yes No No No No Yes 
Industry*Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.712 0.715 0.715 0.715 0.790 0.712 
This table reports regression estimates of the correlation between firms’ imports from LWCs and their plant-level toxic emissions in the U.S. in 1992–2009, based on Equation 1. N=136K, including all 
plants that are surveyed by TRI and with parent firms that import. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are included in square brackets. p-values for all point estimates are less than 0.01 unless 
noted otherwise.  a p-value=0.046. b p-value=0.023. c p-value=0.017. d p-value=0.699. e p-value=0.023. f p-value=0.075. g p-value=0.046. h p-value=0.039. i p-value=0.046. 
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Table 5.  Firms’ imports from LWCs and their U.S. plants' pollution-reduction efforts 
 
 
Abatement 
costs 
(1) 
Abatement 
costs 
(2) 
Pollution 
prevention 
(3) 
Production 
waste 
(4) 
Fuel 
consumption 
(5) 
LWC import share -0.314 -0.738 0.036
c 
-0.183
f
 -0.196 
 [0.097] [0.238] [0.047] [0.073] [0.064] 
Ln(Plant output) 0.423 0.086
a 
0.086 0.190 0.528 
 [0.027] [0.061] [0.014] [0.020] [0.023] 
Skill intensity -1.504 -0.071
b
 -0.068
d 
-0.333 -0.095
h 
 [0.092] [0.237] [0.066] [0.091] [0.089] 
Ln(Capital expenditures) 0.568 -0.440 0.026 0.025 0.038 
 [0.023] [0.063] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] 
Ln(Total imports) 0.045 -0.050 0.001
e 
0.012
g
 -0.001
i 
 [0.007] [0.018] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] 
Industry*year FE Yes No No No No 
Plant FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.407 0.600 0.501 0.452 0.671 
N=50K for Columns [1] and [2], including all plants that are surveyed by both TRI and PACE and with parent firms 
that import. N=136K for Columns [3]-[6], including all plants that are surveyed by TRI and with parent firms that 
import. Standard errors are included in square brackets. p-values for all point estimates are less than 0.01 unless 
noted otherwise. 
a
 p-value=0.159. 
b
 p-value=0.764. 
c
 p-value=0.444. 
d
 p-value=0.303. 
e
 p-value=0.803. 
f
 p-
value=0.012. 
g
 p-value=0.046. 
h
 p-value=0.286. 
i
 p-value=0.841. 
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Table 6. Firms’ imports from LWCs and their pollution contents 
 
Ln(Toxic imports) 
             
             
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
LWC import share 0.239 0.247 1.008 1.043 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.280] [0.281] 
Ln(Firm size) 0.028 0.026 -0.106
a 
-0.129
b
 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.073] [0.073] 
Ln(Total imports) 1.093 1.092 0.330 0.327 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.042] [0.042] 
Year FE Yes No Yes No 
Industry*year FE No Yes No Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.830 0.830 0.636 0.636 
 
This table reports regression estimates of the correlation between firms’ imports from LWCs and the pollution 
intensity of their imports, from 1992 to 2009, based on Eq. 2. N=278K, including all firms that import. Standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are included in square brackets. p-values for all point estimates are less than 0.01 
unless noted otherwise.  
a
 p-value=0.146. 
b
 p-value=0.077. 
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Table 7.  Firms’ imports from LWCs and their U.S. plants’ toxicity-weighted output 
 Ln(Toxic output) 
            
              
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
LWC import share -0.030
 a
 -0.030
 e
 -1.437
h
 -1.595
m
 
 
[0.013] [0.012] [0.681] [0.682] 
Ln(Plant output) 0.999 1.002 -1.502
i
 -1.312
n
 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [1.333] [1.338] 
Skill intensity -0.030
 b
 -0.034 3.295
j
 2.606
o
 
 
[0.013] [0.013] [1.302] [1.299] 
Ln(Capital expenditures) 0.001
c
 0.001
f
 0.112
k
 0.119
p
 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.162] [0.161] 
Ln(Total imports) 0.001
d
 0.0001
g
 0.148
l
 0.057
q
 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.064] [0.064] 
Year FE Yes No Yes No 
Industry*year FE No Yes No Yes 
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.936 0.937 0.423 0.428 
This table reports regression estimates of the impact of firms’ imports from LWCs on their plant-level toxicity-
weighted output in the U.S. in 1992–2009. N=703K, including all plants with parent firms that import. Standard 
errors clustered at the firm level are included in square brackets. p-values for all point estimates are less than 0.01 
unless noted otherwise. 
a
 p-value=0.021. 
b
 p-value=0.021. 
c
p-value=0.317. 
d
 p-value=0.617. 
e
 p-value=0.124. 
f
 p-
value=0.317. 
g
 p-value=0.960. 
h
 p-value=0.035. 
i
 p-value=0.260. 
j
 p-value=0.011. 
k
 p-value=0.489. 
l
 p-value=0.148. 
m
 p-value=0.019.
 n
 p-value=0.327. 
o
 p-value=0.045. 
p
p-value=0.460. 
q
p-value=0.373 
. 
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Table 8.  Local institutional pressure and pollution offshoring 
 
 
Local institutional pressure 
 
DV= Ln(Toxic emissions) 
College 
Education 
(1) 
Voter 
Turnout 
(2) 
Sierra Club 
Membership 
(3) 
LWC import share 0.330
a
 0.890
c 
-2.352
 
 
 [0.214] [0.644] [0.567] 
Local institutional pressure -0.005
b 
0.530
d 
-0.144
g 
 [0.007] [0.784] [0.103] 
LWC import share*Local institutional pressure -0.031 -3.158
e 
-0.478 
 [0.009] [1.554] [0.138] 
Ln(Plant output) 0.451 0.454 0.453 
 [0.025] [0.035] [0.026] 
Skill intensity -0.706 -0.721 -0.698 
 [0.105] [0.151] [0.105] 
Ln(Capital expenditures) 0.047 0.046 0.047 
 [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] 
Ln(Total imports) 0.025 0.025
f 
0.025 
 [0.007] [0.011] [0.007] 
Industry*year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.715 0.715 0.715 
N=136K. The sample and control variables are the same as in Table 4. Standard errors are included in square brackets. p-values for all point estimates are less 
than 0.01 unless noted otherwise.  
a
 p-value=0.123. 
b
 p-value=0.475. 
c
 p-value=0.167. 
d
 p-value=0.499. 
e
 p-value=0.162. 
f
 p-value=0.023. 
g
 p-value=0.201. 
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Table 9. Capability and pollution offshoring 
 
DV= Ln(Toxic emissions) 
Plant productivity 
(1) 
Firm productivity 
(2) 
Firm intangibles 
(3) 
LWC import share -1.408 -0.271
b 
0.005
g 
 [0.495] [0.175] [0.174] 
Capability -0.666 0.036
c 
-0.014
h 
 [0.046] [0.039] [0.007] 
LWC import share* Capability 0.240 0.272
d 
0.045
i 
 [0.083] [0.120] [0.019] 
Local institutional pressure 
(Sierra Club membership) 
-0.501
a 
-0.523
e 
-0.186
j 
 [0.428] [0.433] [0.546] 
LWC import share*Local 
institutional pressure 
-1.644 -1.396
f 
-1.518
k
 
 [0.613] [0.622] [0.697] 
Ln(Plant output) 0.833 0.452 0.522 
 [0.038] [0.026] [0.036] 
Skill intensity -0.732 -0.678 -0.632 
 [0.105] [0.106] [0.131] 
Ln(Capital expenditures) 0.032 0.047 0.048 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] 
Ln(Total imports) 0.023 0.023 0.025 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] 
Industry*year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.715 0.715 0.730 
N=136K for Columns (1) and (2), including the same plants as in Table 4. N=90K for Column (3), including all 
plants that are surveyed by TRI and with parent firms that both import and are publicly listed. Standard errors are 
included in square brackets. p-values for all point estimates are less than 0.01 unless noted otherwise. 
a
 p-
value=0.242. 
b
 p-value=0.121. 
c
 p-value=0.356. 
d
 p-value=0.023. 
e
 p-value=0.227. 
f
 p-value=0.025. 
g
 p-value=0.977. 
h
 p-value=0.046. 
i
 p-value=0.018. 
j
 p-value=0.733. 
k
 p-value=0.029.  
 
 
 
 
 
